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Abstract
Bioethical discourse, as it relates to
common experiences of older people, has
tended to focus on conflictive issues as they
arise in long–term care.  The primary value
that this discourse upholds is autonomy,
understood as self–direction, and the method
of analysis is generally principle– and rule–
based.  Many good changes in long–term
care have come as the result of these efforts.
But much of ethical importance is left out,
limited by how this form of discourse defi-
nes and addresses problems.  This paper ex-
plores a more expansive view of ethics that
attends to context and the particular features
of being an older person in often–
inhospitable settings, takes embodiment as
a key feature in our moral lives, and situates
individuals in important relationships. Using
narratives familiar to those who work with
older people, especially in clinical settings,
this paper will also suggest ways to
reconfigure the familiar subject matter of
bioethics and long–term care.  It will
challenge the dominance of existing values
and so leave new spaces for ethical action.
By bringing in culture, embodiment, and
elder subjectivity, it will begin to move from
the bioethics of long–term care to a concept
of ethics and the older person.
KEY WORDS:  Ethics; aging;
embodiment; Bioethics and long–term care.
Resumen
Prismas morales: ética y adulto mayor
El discurso bioético, referido a las experien-
cias comunes del adulto mayor, ha tendido a
focalizarse en los temas conflictivos que se
originan en la atención de largo plazo.
El principal valor que este discurso sustenta
es el de autonomía, entendida como auto–di-
rección cuyo método de análisis está general-
mente basado en principios y reglas. Muchos
cambios importantes en el cuidado de largo
plazo se han producido como resultado de es-
tos esfuerzos. Pero muchos aspectos de impor-
tancia ética han sido dejados al margen, limi-
tado por la forma en que este tipo de discurso
defina y aborde los problemas. Este artículo
explora una visión más expansiva de la Ética
que presta atención al contexto y a las caracte-
rísticas particulares de ser un anciano, en
entornos a menudo inhóspitos; considera la
corporalidad como una característica funda-
mental en nuestra vida moral y sitúa las re-
laciones interpersonales en un plano de real
importancia. Usando un lenguaje familiar para
aquellos que trabajan con ancianos, especial-
mente en ambientes clínicos, este artículo tam-
bién sugerirá caminos para re–configurar el fa-
miliar tema de la Bioética y la atención de lar-
go plazo. Desafiará el dominio de valores exis-
tentes, abriendo así nuevos espacios para la ac-
ción ética. Al introducir la cultura, la
corporalidad y la subjetividad del anciano, la
bioética del cuidado de largo plazo se despla-
zará hacia un concepto de ética y  adulto ma-
yor.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Ética; envejeci-
miento; corporalidad; Bioética y atención de
largo plazo.
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Resumo
Perspectivas morais: ética e idoso
O discurso bioético relativo às
experiências comuns dos idosos tem mos-
trado a tendência de restringir–se aos temas
conflitivos que se originam da atenção de
longo prazo.
O primeiro valor apresentado é o da
autonomia, entendida como autogoverno, e
o método de análise geralmente é baseado
em princípios e regras. Mudanças importan-
tes nos cuidados à longo prazo produziram–
se como resultado desses esforços, mas
muitos aspectos de importância ética não
foram contemplados, limitados pelo modelo
do discurso e de como foram definidos e
apresentados os problemas.
Este artigo explora uma abordagem mais
densa da Ética, precisamente aquela que da
atenção ao contexto e características parti-
culares do idoso. Apontam–se situações
frequentemente inóspitas nas quais se
identificam características fundamentais de
nossas vidas morais e o alcance relacional
das mesmas.
Usando uma linguagem familiar para os
que trabalham com idosos, particularmente
em clínicas, a presente reflexão faz sugestões
sobre novos caminhos para melhor situar a
temática bioética e a atenção à longo prazo.
Pretende–se, ainda, desafiar o domínio de va-
lores existentes, abrindo novos espaços para
a ação ética.
Ao introduzir cultura, personificação e
subjetividade do ancião busca–se afastar da
bioética do cuidado à longo prazo e aproxi-
mar–se do conceito de ética e pessoa idosa.
PALAVRAS CHAVES: Ética;
envelhecimento; personificação; Bioética e
atenção à longo prazo.
 Résumé
Prismes moraux : éthique et
troisième âge
Le discours bioéthique concernant les
expériences communes de l’homme âgé a éte
focalisé autour des sujets conflictuels qui se
developpent dans des soins à long terme.
La première valeur que ce discours
soutient est celle de l’autonomie ,entendue
comme l’autoguidage et la méthode
d’analyse est fondée, de manière générale,
sur des principes et des règles. Grâce a ces
efforts les soins à long terme ont été
bénéficiés de changements importants.
Néanmoins beaucoup d’ aspects relevants du
point de vue éthique sont restés à l´écart, en
raison de la forme dont ce discours définit et
aborde les problèmes  .Cet article explore une
vision plus vaste  de l’Éthique, celle qui fait
attention au contexte et aux caractéristiques
particulières de l’ homme âgé – dans des
milieux souvent inhospitaliers– qui est
personnifiée comme une caractéristique clé
de nos vies morales et qui situe  à l’individu
dans des relations importantes .Cet article,
en utilisant un langage courant, adressé  à
ceux qui travaillent avec les adultes âgés,
notamment, dans des milieux cliniques
,suggérera également les chemins pour
reconfigurer le sujet familier de la bioéthique
et les soins à long terme.
Il défiera le domaine des valeurs
existantes, en  créant des espaces nouveaux
pour l’action éthique.
Grâce à l’introduction de la culture, la
personnification et la subjectivité de l’
homme d’un grand âge, l’article commencera
à s’éloigner de la bioéthique des soins à long
terme pour s’ approcher au concept de
l’éthique et de l’adulte âgé.
MOTS CLÉS : Ethique; vieillissement;
personnification; Bioéthique et  soins à long
terme.
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Introduction
 The questions of bioethics and medical
ethics are not purely intellectual questions.
They are questions of the heart as well as
the mind, and questions of social
organization, not just the marshalling of
arguments.  It is harder to reform one’s heart
or one’s society than to improve one’s
arguments.  The sort of disciplined reflection
we need on these questions is not merely
intellectual (1, pp. 14–15).
In the United States, reflections and
teaching about ethics and the older person,
as an applied field, are relatively recent,
dating roughly from the early 1980s.  This
attention followed the general surge of
interest in applied bioethics that began in the
mid 1960s; it evolved transferring and
modestly adapting to long–term care the
principle and rule–based model developed
during the previous decade for use in acute
care settings.  Now, at the turn of the century,
it seems appropriate to acknowledge all that
was achieved but also necessary to move in
new directions.  These new directions
encompass close to the ground ethical
questions that one encounters in the clinic,
the hospital, or the home to questions that
touch upon the vast reaches of molecular
biology and the threat or promise of
“immortality.”  Joining these issues are
questions that involve public policy, which
contributes to (or detracts from) the
functioning and indeed the moral legitimacy
of institutional and other structures.  Add to
that the complex problems that age, gender,
class, race, and other inequalities contribute
to the universe of problems compelling
attention. More fundamentally this enlarged
terrain also challenges the now–familiar
bioethics discourse, which not only identifies
the problems that come under moral scrutiny
but also delimits the strategies we use to
analyze them (2).
In this paper, my goals are both more
modest and more ambitious than skimming
over this range of issues.  My orientation,
most broadly, uses insights from feminist
philosophy and postmodernism(s) to open
the scope of ethical discourse so that it is
sensitive to context, which may be as
intimate as one’s body or as broad as one’s
gender, race, age, or ethnicity.  It asks us to
think how it might matter ethically that one
is an 86–year–old woman from a minority
culture.  It queries how age itself challenges
the standard repertoire of issues in bioethical
discourse. And, it moves us from the limited
focus of traditional bioethics to a more
expansive notion of ethics and the older
person.  This approach leads to skepticism
about overarching truth claims and the
practical usefulness of much moral
theorizing in guiding specific action.  In my
re–imagining the world of ethics and old age,
I turn to the words of  T.S. Eliot in Little
Gidding:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(3, p. 59).
I think this is where we need to be in
reflecting about ethics and old age. The
territory is familiar; we have mapped the
terrain and now we must study it at close
range. I will touch upon approximately
fifteen years of good work already done
while examining that work with different
filters. These filters will emphasize the ethics
of the everyday, those gestures, behaviors,
and words that elevate the seemingly
mundane to the ethical importance they
merit.  These day–to–day behaviors make a
common moral world possible and call upon
us to make ongoing adjustments through
shared conversations.  Philosopher Owen
Flanagan has likened morality thought about
this way to social ecology:  “ethics . . . is
part of human ecology concerned with saying
what contributes to the well–being of
humans, human groups, and human
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individuals in particular natural and social
environments.” (4, p. 36). Standard
approaches to bioethics have tended to
obscure this kind of ethical analysis. I am
also interested in seeing other ways to think
about or reconfigure the familiar subjects of
bioethics. The last aspect of ethics that I will
discuss is the furthest from contemporary
approaches to bioethics. This aspect involves
cultural norms and ideals and how they shape
identity, a feature of human life that supports
morally important qualities such as self–
respect and human flourishing (5).
Ethics, aging, the Canon, and beyond
I start with what should be simple and
suggest how age complicates even the sim-
ple.  To start, let me look at bioethics’
traditional territory. Matters of informed
consent, truth telling, confidentiality, and so
on apply to the old as they do to any other
age group, with, however, one important
exception.  Ageism, or the systematic
devaluing of older people, to which I will
return below, is not a new phenomena and,
despite decades of efforts to eliminate it, it
has not disappeared from health care or,
indeed, from society.  Physicians, for
example, still turn to sons and daughters and
even relative strangers to ask questions–
sometimes very personal ones–about
competent older people who are very visibly
present. Not long ago, a resident doing
rounds in a nursing home was interviewing
a patient with self–reported abdominal
discomfort.  He asked her repeatedly if she
had had a bowel movement (I might add this
is the single most commonly asked question
in nursing homes).  She just as repeatedly
said yes.  He then turned to me  (the ethics
consultant on the team but also this woman’s
friend) and asked me the same question. I
could only respond–ask her!–thereby
revealing the importance of the ethics
consultant.  This matter is a serious one; until
such time as people can no longer make sense
of their environments, they generally wish
to be who they are and have been (6, 7);
refusing to listen to their responses about
their own bodies denies them adult status and
belittles personal integrity.
I mention ageism, and give this example,
because no encounter with another person
comes unmediated by our personal and cul-
tural values, attitudes, prejudices, beliefs, and
other conscious or unconscious stereotypes.
So even though the standard repertoire of
issues in bioethics applies to the elderly as
to all others, persisting beliefs about the aged
that often are gender–specific mediate their
use. Older women’s wishes, for example, are
less likely to be respected by their doctors
than the wishes of their male age peers (8).
In art, death assumes a female form (9).
Discounting older people has a long and not
so illustrious history in medicine.  To harm
the old, behavior does not have to be as crude
as Samuel Shem describes in The House of
God but a youthful (and potentially curable)
body holds allures for biomedicine that the
aging body, nicknamed the GOMER (get out
of my emergency room), cannot match (10).
It can be as simple as not speaking directly
to the patient or as complex as relying on
depersonalized care like the use of artificial
feeding and nutrition for the person with
dementia.  Both deny relationship and permit
distancing from the aesthetically displeasing
aging body (11).
Unlike decision–making in acute care
settings, the frequent and varied disabilities
that often accompany old age can create
problems that are rarely solvable.  An
uncertain but mostly downhill course places
demands on health and social service
providers that generally lie outside the scope
of bioethics’ standard repertoire.  Mrs. Porter,
at 94, lived in an independent living
residence that was attached to a nursing
home.  As her physical condition deteriorated
she insisted on remaining in her apartment.
No other option made sense to her. The
discussion among her family, her physician,
Moral Prisms: ethics and the older person - M. Holstein
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the nursing home administrator, the director
of nursing, and me was what to do about Mrs.
Porter.  While she adamantly refused to leave
her apartment the administrator feared that
she would fall; the family was very anxious
about her safety; the attending physician
leaned toward the “oops we can easily get in
trouble” side.  The familiar paradigm that pits
autonomy (as self–directed choice) against
best interests could only take us part of the
way in supporting Mrs. Porter.  We honored
her choice to stay in her apartment for as long
as we could –asking her to also make
compromises– and then acted in her best
interests when we insisted that she move to
the nursing home.  But how remiss we would
have been if we viewed this moral framing
as the only way to consider this situation. It
took what philosopher Harry R. Moody has
called a communicative ethics (12) or an
expressive–collaborative process as opposed
to a juridical one described by philosopher
Margaret Urban Walker (13) to decide how
to honor Mrs. Porter’s most fervent wish to
stay at home while assuaging the fears of her
family, the nursing home administrator, and
the attending physician. Regular, open, equal,
and free–flowing conversation among
members of the team, working with Mrs.
Porter, led to a concrete identification of the
moral ends we sought in her care and the
accommodations necessary by each person
involved, including Mrs. Porter.  It took
recognizing that safety was about more than
physical safety and that home, with all its
positive connotations, had a psychosocial
value that contributed to the continuity of self
(14, 15). For her part, Mrs. Porter had to
agree to more interventions than her
conception of independence (which in itself
is a problematic ideal) would have allowed
but that contributed to meeting her own ends
and protected her important relationships
with her family and the medical team.
 When Mrs. Porter had to move to another
setting we had to rethink what her claims for
respect and moral worth required of us.  This
effort took us beyond autonomy as we sought
ways to honor her feistiness, her still–strong
political commitments, and her need to be
reassured about the many symptoms that
scared her so much.  With Mrs. Porter, it was
not the choice itself that ultimately made the
difference.
A postmodern ethics exposes the hidden
assumptions and presuppositions that support
the commitment to autonomy as self–
direction.  These cannot account well for
frailty, dependency, poverty, professional
power, or other individually held moral
values (2, 17). Not does it account for the
social conditions that limit options for some
more than for others.  Choosing is only one
narrow aspect of our moral lives; while Mrs.
Porter insisted on getting what she wanted,
people in some traditions would not even
countenance individual choice as a value
worth upholding.  For all of us, it is a
minimalist concern, perhaps the beginning
of moral engagement –for some– but hardly
the end of it.  Further, the stress on autonomy,
as traditionally conceived, often ignores the
limits that very sick older people have in
making choices and the limits that staff face
in virtually all health care settings.   The focus
on a certain view of autonomy, which rests
on a particular description of what kind of
people we are, also renders relationships,
especially those with family members, as
optional rather than an integral part of our
identity and the source of obligation.
A situation illustrates this point. A wife
is at the bedside of her husband who is close
to death.  He has been ventilator–supported
for about 10 days in the hope that he could
be weaned from it shortly.  It has become
clear to all the medical personnel that
weaning him from the ventilator will result
in his death.  He has designated his wife as
his proxy and has indicated that he does not
want to be sustained mechanically if he
cannot be returned to a condition
approximating his prior life.  The wife pleads
with the attending physician not to take him
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off the vent, at least not just yet. She’s not
expecting a miracle; she only wants him
around a little longer.  Some questions come
up:  Is his wife only the transmitter of his
prior wishes?  Does the patient’s expressed
former wishes take precedence over all other
important moral goods, like the peace and
tranquility of a loving family and their need
to begin grieving as they say their goodbyes?
What if this man and woman had been
happily married for 50 years and had tried to
accommodate each other in ways that often
involved sacrificing their own desires?  Can
it just be that this man, as he lay dying, might
be less concerned with having his expressed
wishes followed than knowing that his wife
said her goodbyes in a way that brought her
as much comfort as possible in the
circumstances?  Philosopher Margaret Urban
Walker reminds us that preserving integrity
is a central moral value for most people (17).
Working with aging people in such
settings where the likely outcomes are
continued decline and ultimately death is
particularly difficult.  These situations are
usually rife with complexity, ripe with often
unexpressed feelings, and marked by
conflicting values that have little or nothing
to do with making choices.  They have to do
with getting old in societies that venerate the
young; they have to do with the different
ways that families grieve and how people in
families often do what the others want
because that is a more important value than
getting their own way.  In no situation would
I suggest the indefinite use of the ventilator
on the man I shall call Mr. Tomas.  But I
would want to give the family with whom
he has shared the last 50 years of his life some
time.  If relationships count for something,
then Mr. Tomas’s integrity, self–recognition
and self–esteem might better be served by
honoring his wife’s wishes rather than his
own. The power of advance directives (li-
ving wills, and durable powers of attorney
for health care) is the belief that they allow
health professionals and families to do what
the patient wanted but what the patient would
have wanted, if he had been able to reflect
on his actual situation, might have not been
about his medical care.
So an alert is in order:  how might a
preoccupation with autonomy offer us a
means of escape, a way to disengage from
the more difficult and painful parts of being
with ill and dying people? Autonomy lets you
stand at arms’ distance. While the good parts
of an autonomy model are evident it also
contains hidden assumptions about what we
ought to value and why.  These values may
not be the most important ones for a good
number of people who are ill or dying.
Shifting the prism:  another view of
ethics and the individual
Dying exemplifies the limits of a focus
on decision–making. Imagine the dying
person as yourself. What about all those
matters calling for attention: making amends,
showing love, paying attention to small
matters of comfort. Instead demands of
decision–making often divert us. We are kept
busy focusing on treatment options,
obtaining information (the internet
compounds this seemingly unceasing quest
for more information as if that search can
ease the burden of dying), getting second and
even third opinions.  This activity leaves little
time for the loving gesture, the sheer
physicality of a living presence, and the
ending of a life narrative (18).
We cannot avoid the fact of death and the
facticity of human suffering. Victor Frankl,
the prominent founder of logotherapy and a
survivor of the Nazi’s murderous assaults on
not only human life but their efforts to erode
human dignity (ultimately it was the Nazis
themselves who lost even the remnants of
human dignity), told us that there comes a
point when all we can do is to adopt an
attitude toward our suffering since the
suffering itself cannot be taken away (19).
Moral Prisms: ethics and the older person - M. Holstein
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But in thinking about ethics, we must
struggle not to abandon the dying. We all
know the language of palliation and hospice.
While often wonderful and well–suited to a
patient, we still must ask: How often do
physicians and other health care providers
turf people who are dying to a palliative care
specialist or a chaplain they do not know
almost without warning?  How often do their
own doctors abandon them when cure is no
longer possible with the careless words,
“there is nothing more I can do”?  A very
elderly physician once said to me, “I teach
my residents that they must never let a patient
die alone.  I have sat beside patients on many
a night just holding their hand so that they
knew I was with them when they died if they
had no one else” 1 . In a recent novel, an
elderly gentleman stands silently outside the
door of his dying friend’s hospital room
watching intently, deeply present.  When he
walks in and they talk for a bit, he asks his
friend if there is anything that he can do.  The
friend said please rub lotion on my very, very
dry feet (20). In an interesting irony, perhaps
a postmodern ethics can return us to an
ancient one when the virtues and ideas about
human good and not choice occupied a cen-
tral place in ethical thinking.  Inadvertently,
technical medicine and documentation of end
of life wishes can become the substitute for
compassion and understanding.
The ethics of the everyday
Let me turn to the ethics of the everyday.
Often it does not require a great deal of money
to make ethically important actions happen
and sometimes it does not even take much
time.  Such everyday ethics is about a way of
life, part of the everyday world in which we
live, work, and care about others.  It is about
rubbing lotion on the feet of our dying friend.
We live our morality in our day–to–day lives
by exhibiting responsibilities for things open
to human care and response (13). Hence,
much that is ethical occurs when we are
hardly paying attention:  how we talk to
someone, how we greet an older person, what
words we choose to use–the disrespectful he
“was” a lawyer; she’s “just” using her old
social skills; how we work with our
colleagues, and how we learn about and ho-
nor differences. Philosopher and novelist Iris
Murdock observed that the quality of what
happens between moments of choice
importantly affects those choices (21). These
times between moments of choice remain
invisible if our primary ethical orientation is
directed at rights, conflicts, moments of
choice, and on the resolution of conflicts
through the top–down application of
principles. It cannot, for example, include the
denser ethical questions about how health
professionals can help older men and women
flourish despite loss; and what goals and
cultural norms will help achieve those ends.
 To do that well requires the attentiveness
that writers such as Iris Murdock (21) speak
to so eloquently.  It does not require
adherence to one or another moral theory,
which is apt to lay out a number of
possibilities if circumstances were ideal.
Finely tuned ethics and aging demand finely
moral perception; the need to notice what
often gets lost when we study older people
as objects or when we apply a set of rules to
them without really noticing their individual
features and thus do not respond
appropriately to their concerns. While we
cannot respond to all that we notice, without
noticing we see only those moral problems
predefined by the canon.   So I am speaking
of an ethics that takes the  “whole of our
mode of living and the quality of our relations
with the world” (21, p. 97) as our task.  You
might ask, how can I do that, how can I take
on so much.  What you can do, as you set
out to consider ethics and aging is to commit
yourself to paying attention to the language
you use, the expectations that you have, the
needs that you recognize, the stories you let
others tell. The safety you provide so that an
old woman can fall gently may overcome
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much impatience, bitterness, rage, and
sadness that often accompanies growing old
and becoming frail.
This ethics is about the everyday
encounters we have with people who are
facing deep adjustments in their lives for all
too familiar reasons. There is no urgent
dilemma, or interpersonal conflict that
demands resolution but rather a genuine
encounter with individuals who may have
lost a sense of place, a belief that they have
some importance in the world. While practice
is often much richer than the verbal
description of practice, the words spoken in
ethics committees, for example, sound as if
ethics is only about addressing dilemmas.
Does not ethics have something to say when
there is no conflict, no interpersonal
dilemma?   Do we not owe older people some
commitment to hear their stories and to help
them recover lost meaning through the re–
creation of a self that fits with their changed
circumstances?
Everyday ethics is about the way we
structure medical care services in our
countries.  The practices of medicine can
destroy the patient’s sense of status as an
adult, a self–determining person as we press
him to assume the moral and the social
identity implied by the illness that is
diagnosed.  Let’s take Henry who had been
an ardent tennis player all his life.  Since
retirement, tennis has assumed even greater
importance as he continues to develop his
skills.  But Henry collapses on the court one
day.  A heart attack is diagnosed and by–pass
surgery performed.  Henry recovers quite
slowly; tennis seems like another lifetime
ago. Other problems compound his recovery.
Though none are immediately life
threatening, he felt as if he aged about 10
years in 10 days.  Can Henry, when he is in
the hospital with tubes in every orifice,
anxiety his central emotion, and people
hovering over him at every moment,
especially at 2 a.m. be the same man as the
tennis–playing Henry?  He is living in his
body and that body makes him feel alienated
from the great tennis player that he has been.
He doesn’t recognize the body that he
presents to the world.  But the body is a
source of meaning and meaning–creation. “It
is our internal horizon of knowledge and
meaning; it is the perspective that we bring
to bear on the world” (2). As the result of
his physical changes, Henry sees the world
differently and that world sees him
differently.  His wife’s concern, the
cardiologist’s whispers outside his room
during rounds; the medical student listening
intently to his heart sounds all contribute to
profound changes in his social identity.  This
is a different Henry than the guy that
collapsed on the tennis courts just a few
weeks ago.  His embodied experience
generates new meaning and values; for this
reason his body’s limits and how it affects
his relations to others has ethical value (2).
To talk about Henry’s autonomy at that
moment may not be Henry’s central moral
concern.   What do we owe Henry now that
his body and its limits have become so
determining of what he can do?  What ethical
possibilities exist in our moment–to–moment
encounters with Henry? What physician and
philosopher Paul Komesaroff calls
microethics (22).
What happens when, in the name of
competition, we cut corners?  Let us take
another patient, Rosa Fabrique.  She is mildly
demented probably from many small infarcts
in her brain.  She is also incontinent and
severely arthritic.  Her latest hospital stay was
triggered by a pneumonia that was not re-
solved.  She carries on conversations
although at times they are a bit confused.  She
tugs at her diapers and seems to resent
wearing them but the hospital is so short–
staffed that she cannot be toileted regularly.
She is often angry especially when around
the medical residents who give to her day–
to–day care and by the medical students who
are too uncertain about her condition to talk
to her as they would to any other adult. They
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haven’t learned much about people with
dementia although they may know a great
deal about amyloid plaques or APOE4. So
they tend to discount her.  It takes a long time
to understand what she is saying and their
time is pretty limited.  So they rush through
their time with Mrs. Fabrique.  What moral
problem does the situation of Rosa Fabrique
represent?  How do the special features of
her illness make it difficult for her to retain
her adult status?  How does she try to avoid
stigma?  Why is this a moral problem?  How
might gender shape the relationships she has
with the staff?  When I asked a group of
participants at an adult day services center
how they knew when someone respected
them, one woman, with a diagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease, practically jumped
from her seat, exclaiming, “when they talk
to me like I’m a real person!”  A useful insight
from Mrs. La Fontaine, an artist, who also
happens to have Alzheimer’s disease.
Reaching to culture:  the individual
in culture and society
These examples link the individual to
society.  I want to explore briefly the ethical
implications of the social devaluing of older
people, especially women, and people with
disabilities (23). An often hidden ageism–
directed at people who do not live up to the
newest ideals of a healthy and successful
aging–operates at the nexus of individual and
society, the intangible site where individuals
encounter cultural norms and political
constraints. Because of its effect on moral
identity and integrity, it has important and
unexamined ethical implications.  The social
marginalization of many older people, their
invisibility as others define their needs, and
their relative powerlessness all have ethical
implications.  An older woman captured the
feeling that expert discourse can create:  “old
age is a time of devastating losses:  our
health, our lifelong friends, our money, our
status, our dearest friend of all, our spouse.
But we can handle all of these.  We can
tolerate the ravages of aging.  But what we
cannot tolerate, what we cannot stand, is for
younger people to tell us what is best for us.
We just cannot put up with that” (24).
Women have long done the invisible tasks
that allowed others to flourish–husbands,
children, and employers; yet, they achieved
little moral approbation for these efforts.  As
women age, cultural marginalization
becomes more pronounced.  From the
perspective of those who embody dominant
cultural norms–the world of biomedicine, for
example–old women often represent a
disruption of the visual field; like others who
are classed as abnormal, disabled, or
otherwise different, the old come to be seen
and evaluated as less–than (25).
What then is the ethical import of this
bodily aging in this first year of the 21st
century?  Henry’s body was not only aging
but it was damaged in ways that required a
remaking of his self–valuation as well as the
valuing of others.  But even without physical
or mental damage, the very appearance of
the aging body and its “normal” limits would
not matter if it were not critically tied to
identity, to some notion of who we are, what
we take as our ends or purposes, what values
we hold dear.  And identity has links to other
morally important features of human life, in
particular, the possibility for well–being.
Roughly, human flourishing requires, in
addition to identity, self–respect, self–
knowledge, friendship, and confident agency
(5). Thus, there are close connections
between identity and other goods and
normative ideals.
If the goals of identity (or a sense of the
self) are so important in achieving other
normative ideals, then we must consider the
ethical implications of cultural norms and
ideals. If the self is basically social as many
social scientists and philosophers hold, then
culture and other aspects of our social lives
have much to do with identity creation and
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the ability to live morally satisfying lives.
Social disregard, if not disdain, of aging
represents constant threats to self–esteem and
dignity.  For older people, it often leads to
the separation of “me” from the body, an
ultimately defeatist strategy.  Most cultures
have a long way to go in creating conditions
to support the psychological integration of
mind and body.
Thus, many contemporary societies
present problems for older people who are
seeking a strong identity despite loss.  This
problem becomes confounded by the way
culture shapes the impressions and reactions
of others.  Since there is no transparent
encounter with another, societal ageism and
its opposite–visions of successful or
productive aging–consciously or
unconsciously influence our encounters with
each older person we meet.  We carry
impressions, images, and ideas, which shape
our interactions with others.  Watch yourself
closely some time and reflect on your
responses to that woman who shuffles along
with her cane and her shopping bag.
Let me just use a few specific examples.
Think for a moment about the 80 year old
man, still living at home, but needing consi-
derable help to do so hearing himself
described as a “greedy geezer.”  Why haven’t
we–at least we North Americans–banished
that word from our vocabulary?  By the same
token, think of that man–the 78 year old
struggling with multiple disabilities–and
recent efforts to promote cultural
representations of aging as either
“productive” or “successful.”  To the extent
that all of us assess ourselves–at least to some
degree–by cultural standards, criteria that
immediately elicit their opposites cannot be
the images that we want to sanctify.  And no
matter how carefully we ingest our vitamins,
do weight–bearing exercises, eat a low–fat
diet, and do whatever else the gurus of long–
life tell us to do, our aging processes are not
singularly within our control.
Where do all these assertions bring me?
I stress these features of our encounters with
the specific features of old age–physical, and
mental changes, dependency and death–
because they are what we resist most
powerfully.  While I do not want to return to
earlier assumptions about old age–
conveniently labeled the “decline and loss”
paradigm–, I think we have gone so far in
the other direction that we morally denigrate
the old who cannot live up to the new
stereotypes.  Our problem is not reversing
that former dominant paradigm and
emphasizing its polar opposite–the mountain
climbing grandfather and the kayaking great–
grandmother–but finding ways to accept that
human well-being–though not necessarily
without suffering– is possible even in the face
of illness, loss, and death.   So in our efforts
to notice, to pay attention, we come to the
realization that age will always be associated
with death (unless the manufacturers of
stem–cell created spare parts have their way)
because in the normal course of things (at
least in the last few decades) death comes to
the old.  Each person arrives at some point
where she is more old than young–at least
chronologically–and, for most of us, we feel
our chronology physically (For the over 50s
reading this, admit it–don’t you get more
tired that you did 20 years ago?).  Even the
postmodern, self–creating consumer of
desert golf courses and Armani clothes
becomes old, usually at the onset of some
chronic condition that no amount of
consumer fixes can remedy.  No cane or the
best–decorated walker can remove the public
image of old age. But it is even simpler and
more direct than that.  This aging is very
public because the bodily self that we put
out into the world can neither be hidden nor
denied (26,27). Each time I go on the bus
my brown hair generously sprinkled with
gray and new facial lines, albeit gentle ones,
accompany me and even though I weigh the
same now as I did 20 years ago, no more
trips to those Northern California “clothes
Moral Prisms: ethics and the older person - M. Holstein
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optional” hot springs for this aging body.
I and each of us and the old person we
will now attend to become old in a particu-
lar culture at a particular historical moment.
And despite the power of that Armani blazer,
even the prominent society women, becomes
old, generally first in the eyes of others.  Let
us beware as we think of population aging
of painting false scenarios for what will be
the “new” aged.
We also come to see that the big tasks are
cultural ones–that resisting ageism in
whatever form it takes does not mean
elevating an older person who is not old.  I
mean by that seemingly paradoxical
statement, someone who at 75 looks and
behaves like a 40 year old. Imagine how
coercive that kind of standard is if you are
75 and feel like you are 80 and can hardly
walk across the street, not because you
abandoned the treadmill or the tennis courts
but because you developed rheumatoid
arthritis when you were 35 or because you
have completed your second round of
chemotherapy for breast cancer.  In an effort
to change the images of aging, I am afraid
we have done just the opposite.   Philosopher
Sarah Ruddick notes,  “in trying to create
mutually helpful and respectful relationships
in which we can fall and be caught ‘with
dignity,’ we have at least as much to learn
from elderly people who fail as from the
vigorously healthy” (28, p. 59). So we wind
up, if these observations make any sense at
all, at the nexus of the individual and culture,
the larger contextual framework for a
conversation about ethics and aging.  If we
are to take ethics and aging as more than a
set of rules or principles that we bestow upon
the elderly in the form of rights–actually a
relatively simple agenda– then culture is an
important starting place and we are the
individuals who help to constitute our
cultures. I think our tasks are cut out for us.
Conclusion
How do we get to this place of
attentiveness and all the actions that flow
from it when we are concerned about the
costs of medicine, the growing population
of the elderly, and the general resistance to
paying for the care of the stranger in our
midst?  I think we must acknowledge the real,
the contemporary political situations in our
countries without losing sight of what we
would want and what it would take to live a
denser, richer ethical life.  “Without the light
of language,” historian Michael Ignatieff
observed, “we risk becoming strangers to our
better selves” (29, p. 142).  We need to find
a way for positive emotions, like compassion,
and the concept of  “cleaving” as Ruth did
with Naomi in the Hebrew Scriptures or
being one with another to reenter our public
conversation. Such reentry can evoke a
commitment to action by opening us to the
suffering of others and accepting that our
reactions to such suffering are fundamentally
moral (30). Alertness to how the normative
assumptions that support politics and policy
and the power of ideology and culture
become manifest in “ordinary” lives can
become the foundation for a sustained ethical
analysis of how background conditions
mediate life’s possibilities and reinforce
conditions of inequality.
To close, I want to note problems–four
factors that may confound our best efforts to
behave in an ethical manner.  One is the
power relationships that contribute to
domination and inequality in relations among
people that threatens the very possibilities
of ethical behavior.  Two, institutional and
organizational factors can often inhibit what
we know is morally appropriate behavior and
this danger accelerates as funding becomes
more constrained.  Three, caregivers who are
not the beneficiaries of good care can rarely
provide good care.  This factor requires ex-
tra vigilance as we work with people who
have the least autonomy and freedom of all–
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the nurses’ aides and other frontline
caregivers.  And, fourth, as noted above, as
a powerful cultural force, medicine itself
helps create the moral values that older
people feel they must uphold.  Such
culturally powerful messages, I suggest, have
important, and not necessarily positive
ethical implications. So in thinking about an
ethics and aging we must pay attention to
how medicine has shaped that experience in
terms of beliefs, expectations, judgments,
and promises and ask if this is indeed a vision
that we support.
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